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This essay critiques Orientalist constructions of Chinese-Filipinos in British
and American fiction, travel writing and reportage over four centuries. The
Chinese as skinflint entrepreneur is perhaps the oldest stereotype in this
repertoire, reaching back to Daniel Defoe in 1725, and bearing common
attributes with the anti-Semitic modelling of Jews in Europe. A century
later, travel writers Charles Wilkes and William Henry Thomes conflate
concerns about Chinese migration to the UK and US with disquiet about
Chinese economic activity in Manila. While these authors revere the
enterprising spirit of the Chinese, they are also anxious that the Chinese
are depriving other ethnic groups of jobs and opportunities to prosper.
Another paradox came into play towards the end of the century when an
ascendant middle class of mixed race Chinese méstizos produced both the
wealthy businesspeople who shored up the socioeconomic status quo and
the leading personalities of the Philippine independence movement that
sought to overturn that status quo. Western writers of the time invest this
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ultimately untrustworthy when dealing with westerners. Although such
patent Sinophobia lulled as the twentieth century wore on, geopolitical
events intervened to ensure that innuendos about Chinese elitism and
money-grabbing survived in the work of Raymond Nelson and Timothy
Mo. These texts respond to the rise of the People’s Republic of China to
regional superpower status and the consequences of this new multilateral
world order for the Philippines. By the election of President Rodrigo
Duterte in 2016, anti-Chinese sentiment reignited, hypocrisy a crucial part
of the kindling. At the same time as overlooking or vindicating the
exercising of American “hard” and “soft” power over the Philippines,
Jonathan Miller and other liberal Orientalists exaggerate China’s military
and economic threat to Manila, Southeast Asia and the West.
The momentous origin story of the Chinese in the Philippines has common-
alities with those of other diasporas around the world. It is a narrative of
adaptation and reinvention, negotiation and integration; and, more disturb-
ingly, of the community’s ridicule, ruthless interpellation and frequently
lethal oppression at the hands of the “host” regime. Chinese emigration to
the Philippines dates back to at least the tenth century, when merchants
from Fujian and neighbouring regions flocked to the archipelago to trade
cotton, textiles and other profitable commodities (Yap 1998, 53). When
the Spanish established their colonial government in Manila in 1571, they
were keenly aware of the economic value of the capital city’s sangley – as
the Spanish now dubbed the Chinese – traders, craftspeople, artisans and
goldsmiths. To ensure the loyalty of their new subjects, the Spanish launched
a campaign of religious conversions and encouraged intermarriage with
indios (Christianized native Malay Filipinos). Those who complied were
placed in the ghetto of Binondo, which is now thought to be the oldest “Chi-
natown” district of any city in the world. Those who did not comply were
semi-imprisoned in a worse ghetto called Parián, where they had to
observe strict curfews and could not leave the district without formal per-
mission from the Spanish (Yap 1998, 53).
Throughout the seventeenth century, themistreatment of the Chinese along
with further “Chinese immigration would periodically contribute to rising
tensions between the Spanish settlers and the growing numbers of Chinese
labourers and artisans”, argues the Filipino historian Luis H. Francia (2014,
62). In 1603, 1639 and 1662, these tensions led to Spanish massacres of
over fifty thousand Chinese in total (Clodfelter 2017, 61). As is conventional
of racist violence in other historical contexts, these atrocities were justified
ideologically by slandering and stereotyping the victims. Under the Spanish
colonial gaze, the Chinese were variously but often concurrently homosexual
(Garcia 2008, 387), disease-carrying, unhygienic, untrustworthy, seditious,
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parochial, irreligious and –most significantly for the focus of this essay – econ-
omically successful enough to destabilize the status quo. As with other cul-
tural and racial stereotypes, these can be contested and deconstructed in
various ways, and that is partly the objective of this article, especially when
we start to explore western literary adumbrations of the Chinese. For
example, the homosexuality allegation is a classic case of “victim-blaming”,
given that, according to Edgar Wickberg, it was produced by the Spanish cre-
ation of the Parián ghetto in which there was a predominance of male sang-
leys, as few Chinese women were permitted to settle in the Philippines at
that time (Wickberg 1997, 157).
While the western literary texts on the Philippines that I consider in this
here do not repeat this particular slur, they nonetheless appropriate other
Spanish anxieties about Chinese Filipino professional activities and class
positionality. In addition, these western constructions are inflected to differ-
ent degrees by western metropolitan concerns about the Chinese in China,
and their presence in other parts of Asia and in western societies themselves.
The result is a supranational stereotype of the Chinese patterned by western
assumptions about the characteristics of Chinese populations in at least three
continents. (By the late nineteenth century, argues the historian Richard Chu,
this supranational framing of the Chinese was beginning to influence ideo-
logically the Malay-origin majority in the Philippines because the western
“discourse on the Chinese in other parts of the world no doubt affected the
views of those in the Philippines”) (2010, 75). As is the wont of classic Orien-
talist generalization and homogenization, the stereotype therefore is not
especially alert to the unique traits of the Chinese in Manila.
A brief passage from Daniel Defoe’s A New Voyage Around the World by
a Course Never Sailed Before (1725), a fictionalized travelogue which was
“designed to enlist the sympathy of its readers for a serious scheme of colo-
nization” (Jack 1961, 324), inaugurates the main coordinates of this suprana-
tional stereotype that will beget later Orientalist writing on the Philippines:
Our ship was now an open fair; for, two or three days after, came the vessel back
which went away in the night, and with them a Chinese junk, and seven or eight
Chinese or Japanners; strange, ugly, ill-looking fellows they were, but brought a
Spaniard to be their interpreter, and they came to trade also, bringing with them
seventy great chests of China ware exceeding fine, twelve chests of China silks of
several sorts, and some lackered cabinets, very fine. We dealt with them for all
those, for our supercargo left nothing, he took everything they brought. Our
traders were more difficult to please than we: for as for baize and druggets, and
such goods, they would not meddle with them; but our fine cloths and some
bales of linen they bought very freely. So we unloaded their vessel and put our
goods on board. We took a good sum of money of them besides; but whither
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they went we knew not, for they both came and went in the night too, as the other
did. (Defoe 1725, 268)
These merchants are Chinese nationals encountered off the coast of Luzon
and not residents of Manila, but this does not matter to the supranational
stereotype Defoe is helping to hatch. The merchants are, according to
Defoe, clearly good at their jobs, for their wares are “very fine”, although
they have a fastidious, “difficult to please” business mindset. Such emphasis
on “the Chinese… association with money” has since Defoe become a “per-
vasive truism” in Philippines-related discourses, according to the Chinese Fili-
pina literary historian Caroline S. Hau (2000, 152). For Defoe, these men are
inscrutable – are they in fact Chinese “or Japanners”? – and unpredictable
creatures of the night whose onward destination is an enigma. This “other-
ing” of the Chinese as estranged and displaced would not be out of step
with official Spanish attitudes of the era, given that the colonial state had
issued a decree in 1686 “calling for the mass deportation of the Chinese”
and would do so again in 1744 (Chu 2010, 55). As far as Defoe is concerned,
the mysterious actions of these seaborne Chinese fit with their “strange”
appearances. As we will see, subsequent Orientalists will go much further
and reduce Chinese conduct, customs and habits to biological attributes, con-
forming to the classic racist worldview in which “group differences in phys-
ical traits are considered a determinant of social behaviour and moral or
intellectual qualities” (Van Den Berghe 1970, 87).
Problematic as it is, Defoe’s portrait of the Chinese is more lenient than
those of succeeding Orientalists; more Sino-suspicious than Sinophobic, as
it were. We might impute this to the fact that, while the “Yellow Peril” bogey-
man of China as a territorial and civilizational threat to the “Occident” had
been a staple of Western European political rhetoric since the reign of
Genghis Khan, by Defoe’s time the “First British Empire”was not yet in com-
petition with China and British public sentiments towards the Chinese were
generally favourable (Frayling 2014). But around the same time A New
Voyage was published, European settlers in North America were seized by
a “Chinamania” for imported Chinese tea, porcelain and fabrics, a societal
craze that solidified the notion in the fledgling US that the Chinese were
shrewd entrepreneurs (Lee 2016, 29). After the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, American businessmen were eager to compete with Europe for
gainful Chinese trade, a venture that began in November 1783 when the
first ever US cargo ship (filled with ginseng) set sail for Beijing (29).
In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, European and American political
elites had changed their stance, now fearing Chinese encroachment into the
Dutch colony in Java and the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Australia
as grave challenges to western hegemony in the region (Lyman 2000, 689).
While such apprehension certainly instructed Orientalist attitudes, their
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imaging of the Chinese was motivated more by anxieties about a double
Chinese threat to capitalism in the Philippines and in the West. In both
these locations, Chinese entrepreneurs were allegedly siphoning business
away from other ethnic communities, while lower-level Chinese workers
were seen to be obtaining jobs that rightfully belonged to “native” groups.
In the case of the Philippines, after the Spanish relaxed immigration laws
in the early 1800s and the Chinese population mushroomed from 8,000 to
100,000 (Wickberg 1997), Chinese Filipino business clans came to dominate
the country’s lucrative cash crop industries (the products of which were often
processed in and always exported from Manila), to the detriment of foreign
companies’ profits (Constantino 2010, 118). At the same time, there was a
sharp increase in the number of Chinese employed in more proletarian
retail and “coolie” roles (Wickberg 1997), which chipped away at méstizo
and Filipino dominance of “urban provision”, amongst other sectors (Are-
nsmeyer 1980, 190). Inside the West – or more specifically the US – there
was establishmentarian envy towards Chinese immigrant ownership of
laundry, horticulture, retail and catering operations that were thought to
require “enterprising acumen” (Kwong and Dušanka 2007, 10–20), while
the big American labour unions, purporting to defend the interests of the
white proletariat, blamed poorer Chinese labourers for “[driving] down
wages, [taking] away jobs” and supinely volunteering to become “pawns of
factory owners and greedy capitalists” (35). The doubleness of this monetary
based alarm about the Chinese in both the East and West is captured in
numerous Orientalist texts of the period. Before settling in the Philippines
as a Presbyterian activist who would occasionally intervene in public
debates about politics and religion, the Scottish merchant Robert MacMick-
ing spent three years in Manila, an experience he recorded in his 1851 travel
memoir Recollections of Manilla and the Philippines During 1848, 1849 and
1850. In the book – something of a patchwork of narratives about notable
people and places; polemical screeds on geopolitics and economics; and cat-
alogues of information on media, etiquette, transport, food, drink and
accommodation – MacMicking observes, “These China shopkeepers have
nearly driven all competition, except with each other out of the market, –
very few Mestizos or Spaniards being able to live on the small profits
which the competition amongst themselves has reduced them to” (23).
Writing a little before MacMicking, the American adventurer Charles
Wilkes, who commanded the United States Exploring Expedition (1838–
42) to investigate opportunities for global resource exploitation, avers that
“the Chinese… have almost monopolized all the lucrative employments
among the lower orders” (1849, 462). But Wilkes’ wariness here is mitigated
by his praise elsewhere in his account for the Chinese as “all activity” (17)
thanks to their enthusiasm for trade. This further double, even contradictory
gaze was echoed in a late Victorian edition of the London Times which
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intersowed warnings about the influx of Chinese jobseekers to England with
admiration for their “hard-working, patient and economical” disposition.
Similarly, in the 1840s and 1850s, the stance of US newspapers on Chinese
miners in the American West alternated between admiration for their work
ethic and disdain of their “servile”, “clannish, deceitful” ways (Kwong and
Dušanka 2007, 44–45). It is probable that Orientalist Sinophobia was also
determined by formal and informal restrictions placed on the types of
work Chinese could carry out in both the US and in the Philippines. In the
US, out of fear of competition for their livelihoods, Irish and French immi-
grant miners – and later on, American trades unionists – physically intimi-
dated many Chinese migrants into taking up alternative employment in the
laundry, restaurant and other sectors stated above. In the Philippines, the
existence of a Chinese bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century was partly the
long-term consequence of an early Spanish colonial policy of prohibiting
the Chinese from farming, leaving them little choice but to indulge in mercan-
tile activities. Therefore, the complaints Wilkes, MacMicking and others
make about Chinese over-representation in certain economic areas lack his-
torical understanding and constitutes a form of victim-blaming in which the
Chinese are to be held accountable for conditions not of their own making.
Such victim-blaming along the lines of labour and capital bears a parallel
with European anti-Semitism which, according to David Nirenberg, grew out
of medieval laws “[barring] Jews from many economic activities”, which had
the knock-on effect of “[channelling] Jews into specific financial institutions
such as money lending and tax collecting” (2013, 196–97). Coterminous with
Victorian/Edwardian Orientalist unease about lower- and upper-class
Chinese, British novelists from Benjamin Disraeli to G. K. Chesterton to
Hilaire Belloc variously sketched Jews as, “skilful accumulators of property”
(Cheyette 1995, 67), poor, insular, submissive (181–82) and guilty of finan-
cial crimes such as the 1912 Marconi insider trading scandal (151). Of
course, the Jewish and Chinese diasporas are not the only subaltern ethnic
groups ever to have been vilified as economic parasites, but the comparison
seems appropriate to the time and place under scrutiny in this essay. As
Chu observes, “Spanish historical experiences with non-Christians such as
the Jews and the Muslims may have influenced Spanish policy toward the
Chinese” in the early colonial epoch discussed above, when Spanish endea-
vours to either Christianize the Chinese or ban them from the Philippines
replicated Spain’s campaign a century earlier to convert the Jewish popu-
lation of Iberia on pain of expulsion (2010, 56). By the nineteenth century
these aggressive policies were no more, but conflations between the
Spanish maltreatment of the Jews in Iberia and the Chinese in Manila sur-
vived in residual hegemonic attitudes towards the Chinese as a “national min-
ority” (81) and as “economic scapegoats” for an array of capitalist crises in
the colony (83). It is likely that Wilkes and MacMicking, as learned men
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who diligently researched the destinations they wrote about, would have
been aware of such Spanish anti-Sinicism, if not its exact affiliations with
Spanish anti-Semitism.
A good proportion of the British novels mentioned above, along with much
visual media of the same period, feature the stereotypical physiognomy of the
Jew, the most infamous aspect of which is an exaggeratedly large nose. As the
cultural historian Sara Lipton (2014b) argues, this characteristic probably
originated in mid-medieval art as a derogatory emblem of the Jews’ “misdir-
ected gaze” away from Christ, implying an heretical “materialism” inimical to
Christian spiritualism. Later, the proboscal trope came to symbolize a form
of “materialism” that is much closer to our modern understanding of the
word: when money lending had become a leading enterprise in Europe,
Jewish “‘worldliness’ and ‘fleshiness’ was underscored by luxurious clothing
and exaggerated facial features, especially large, hooked noses” (2014b).
Although redrawn slightly by subsequent calumnies such as the “inter-
national Jewish banking conspiracy” peddled by fascists (and some leftists)
in the 1930s and 1940s, the stereotype has survived more or less intact to
the present day. (The modelling of the Jews as a global clique somewhat
immune to local peculiarities is an additional congruity with the suprana-
tional stereotype of the Chinese in or around Manila.)
Similarly, in the second half of the nineteenth century when Social Darwin-
ism was á la mode and the US was enacting a series of eugenic laws that effec-
tively banned Chinese immigration, Orientalist texts present certain
biological attributes as the outward expression of their Chinese characters’
mean, parsimonious and/or enterprising dispositions. As with the most pro-
minent western supporters of eugenics in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries (including economist John Maynard Keynes, writer H. G. Wells and
Fabian intellectual Sidney Webb), these Orientalists were politically liberal
or leftist, at least by the standards of their time. During his governorship of
British-ruled Hong Kong in the mid-to-late 1850s, John Bowring was
known as a progressive reformist who increased native representation in the
colony’s legislative council and lifted the ban on Hongkongers from serving
as jurors and lawyers (Kyshe andWilliam 1898, 42). But making such conces-
sions to the Chinese did not dampen Bowring’s attitude of racial essentialism,
as is apparent from the claims he makes in his 1859 travelogue A Visit to the
Philippine Islands. “The Chinese physiognomy, and the Chinese character”,
hewrites, “had left their unmistakable traces in thewhole population” of a dis-
trict of Panay Island, south ofManila (99). He goes on to append a description
of “The slanting position of the [Chinese mens’] eyes, forming an angle over
the nose, the beardless chin, the long and delicate fingers” with the assertion,
“the Indians [Malay-Filipinos]… believe them [the Chinese] to be masters of
the art of money-getting” (116). Implicit in Bowring’s almost abutting juxta-
positions of Chinese facial lineaments and personality traits is the close
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association between the two phenomena. But to understand the full impli-
cations of thosemenacing “slanting eyes” and “delicate fingers” for the unplea-
sant demeanour of the Chinese, we must read on fifty or so pages:
the Chinaman makes his profit, buying the labour of the indebted and extorting its
maximumwith coarse and often cruel tyranny. The Chinese have a proverb that the
Indian must be led with rice in the left hand of his master and a bamboo in the right.
(163)
Gait and posture could also be signifiers of a penny-pinching worldview, as in
the case of the American whaler, gold digger and seafarer William Henry
Thomes’ novel Life in the East Indies (1875), which depicts an “awkward
China man… appearing courteous to all, while in his heart he despises the
throng for its waste of money in riding in carriages as long as feet are able
to support the body” (10). The Victorian Orientalist preoccupation with
the semiotics of the Chinese body may have originated from the case of
Afong Moy who, in 1834, was the first recorded Chinese woman to immi-
grate to the US. The Carne Brothers impresarios took her to New York
City and placed her on public display in a “Chinese Saloon” simulacrum
replete with red lanterns, satin curtains and Chinese objets d’art (Lee 2016,
32). In Lee’s view,
Afong Moy’s exhibit sent out a clear message: China and the Chinese were exotic,
different, and as Moy’s bound feet further illustrated, degraded and inferior. By
relegating her to an exotic curiosity, the Carne Brothers and all who came to
gawk at her reaffirmed the West’s superiority as well as the great differences
between the United States and China. (33)
Orientalist constructions of Chinese Manileños took a very different tack
during the political upheavals of the 1890s. The new, rising bourgeoisie of
Chinese méstizos (people of mixed Chinese and Spanish or Malay heritage)
would have provoked an ambiguous reaction among outsiders with a politi-
cal and commercial stake in Manila. While western firms were dependent on
the goodwill of the Chinese méstizos because they were prominent in the
domestic cash crop trade, the centrality of the group to the burgeoning inde-
pendence movement – not to say its vital intellectual role in defining Filipino
national identity – would have given western imperialists cause to label them
as subversive (Tan 1987, 141–42). Archibald Clavering Gunter’s popular
adventure novel Jack Curzon (1898), about a British shipping clerk who is
drawn into political intrigue when he travels to the Philippines in pursuit
of a beautiful Spanish-American méstiza named Mazie Gordon, illuminates
the dialectical positioning of the Chinese in the racial-social-political con-
figuration of Manila at that time. Early in the story, we are introduced to
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Ah Khy, a “Chinese dandy” who has supposedly benefited from contact with
western civilization, having studied at Yale University, learned upper-crust
American slang and assumed a dapper, metropolitan style of dress. On the
boat trip from Hong Kong to Manila, Ah Khy impresses the eponymous
hero of the novel as a member of a pan-Asian dominant caste whose father
owns a multinational shipping company. While Ah Khy’s wealth and high
breeding allows Curzon to accept him as a gentleman and near-equal, the
Briton has misgivings about the hybridity of the “Chinaman’s”Oriental phy-
siognomy and the authenticity of his “Fifth Avenue swell” (40). Moreover,
when Ah Khy invites Curzon to conspire with him against the shady
German arms dealer Adolph Ludenbaum, Curzon inwardly reflects, “Ah
Khy is by no means a safe partner in anything that may bring us under the
suspicion of the Spanish Government”. Curzon then urges Ah Khy to avoid
entanglement in “the insurgent business”, for the Spanish are now shooting
Chinese dissenters on the street, at which point Ah Khy turns pale (124).
Despite his commendable western airs, Ah Khy is a coward and cannot be
trusted now Chinese like him are enemies of the state. Indeed, a contempor-
ary reviewer of Jack Curzon for the GlasgowHerald newspaper hints at these
alarmingly contradictory aims and motives when he refers to the “rather
funny conception” of Ah Khy as a “Europeanised Chinaman” (“Jack
Curzon” 1899). The word “funny” in this context has a “relational value”,
to use the terminology of the critical linguist Norman Fairclough (2013,
97), closer to words such as “strange”, “eerie” or “disturbing” rather than
“droll” or “amusing”.
The Philippine-American War did nothing to alter the fetish of the Chinese
as “[artful] salesmen”, as the American author H. Irving Hancock put it in his
1912 adventure yarn Uncle Sam’s Boys in the Philippines. But, in this same
story, Hancock, who had reported from the Philippines during the
Spanish-American War of 1898 and afterwards made a remunerative
career out of writing pro-imperialist “dime” novels (“H. Irving Hancock”
1922), uses one such salesman to make an ideological point about the funda-
mental righteousness of American expansionism in the Philippines and how
this is to be negotiated with subject populations. In an early scene from the
book, a conspicuously soigné Malay-Filipino man follows Sergeant Hal
Overton of the Thirty-fourth United States Infantry into a Chinese-owned
shop on the opulent Calle de Escolta street. When the “smiling yellow
heathen” of a proprietor tries to cheat Hal over the price of a teak and sandal-
wood chest, the Malay-Filipino intervenes and offers to pay for it himself. “I
have been permitted to do a courtesy to an Americano”, he glows. “I am not a
poor man”, he continues, “not since the Americanos came to these islands and
gave us the blessings of liberty and just government” (Hancock 1912, 19).
When the Malay-Filipino informs Hal that he is a “silent partner” (20) of
the Chinese shopkeeper, Hal nobly refuses the gift and the dispute is
THE MAKING OF A SUPRANATIONAL STEREOTYPE
Tom Syke s
9............................
settled. This encounter could be read as a colonial allegory: any threats that
Chinese prosperity may pose to US authority inManila can be delicately mol-
lified by the comprador class of Malay-Filipinos – “little brown brothers”, as
the discourse of “benevolent assimilation” (Miller 1984, 134), the new Amer-
ican liberal brand of imperialism, had it – and the Chinese will accept their
proper place within the new power hierarchy of Manila. However, this
process of interpellation may not be as straightforward as all that because,
soon enough, the Malay-Filipino, whose name we learn is Vicente Tomba,
becomes a “little brown monster” (70) when he and his insurgent comrades
abduct Hal as part of a “plot against the American Government” (74).
When Hal’s unit is dispatched out of peaceful, Americanized Manila to
crush the last of the MoroMuslim rebels in Mindanao in the southern Philip-
pines, Tomba reappears in this theatre of war as “right-hand man to the datto
[enemy chieftain]” (218) – a metaphorical reminder that, even by 1912, a
decade after the official end of the Philippine-American War, US control
over the territory and its social/ethnic groups had not yet been cemented
and the Chinese population were not to be trusted for at least two reasons.
According to Chu, the Chinese-Filipinos took a pragmatic, “wait-and-see
attitude” to the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars that pre-
saged the US occupation and were willing to cooperate for the sake of self-
survival with both the “local rebels and the imperial powers” (2010, 86)
(in Hancock’s narrative, the shopkeeper’s sneaky compact with Tomba
makes sense in these terms). Neither these acts nor their attempts to petition
mainland China for protection during the hostilities (87) would have inspired
American confidence in Chinese loyalty to the new colonial set-up.
After the conflict, Orientalist writers came to see the Chinese in increasingly
genderized and sexualized terms. Again, this perception was as likely shaped
by public affairs in the West as in the East. In the latter 1800s, labour legis-
lation in the US compelled Chinesemen to take upwork that was traditionally
the preserve of American women, such as washing, cleaning and cooking. By
the 1910s, Hollywood films were stocked with effeminate Chinese caricatures
engaged in such activities (Kwong and Dušanka 2007, 128). Although the
Chinese in Manila were not in reality subject to the same divisions of
labour, it is telling that the Orientalist gaze at this time rests upon a “waiter,
pigtail flying” (Boyce 1914, 43), a dry goods (foodstuffs and sewing equip-
ment) trader (Robb 1926, 191) and other images of Chinese employed in
servile and arguably feminine lines of work. If the Chinese were belittled for
being domesticated like western women, they were also accused of being a
threat to western women. Perhaps mindful of the mass-popular Fu Manchu
novels by Sax Rohmer, whose eponymous antagonist abducted and mesmer-
ized respectable Caucasian ladies and of the American eugenics lobby’s moral
panic over theChinese influxweakening thewhite race throughmiscegenation
(Kwong and Dušanka 2007, 117–22), the American Associated Press foreign
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correspondentWalter Robb (“Books and Authors” 1927), in his travel chron-
icleTheKhakiCabinet andOldManila (1926), reports on aManileñoChinese
dry goods trader who victimizes white females specifically: “every American
woman who comes to Manila gets cheated in her first encounter with the
wily heathen” (238). In an unusually caustic – even for that time – feature
article in the Atlanta Constitution newspaper, journalist Muriel Bailey is
more explicit about the sexual menace of Chinese-Filipinos. That these men
have a monopoly over Manila’s “places of vice” and “their own women are
not allowed in the country” suggests that they are prone to promiscuity and
miscegenation. Indeed, the warning sign for Bailey is that many Chinese
have already married into and dominated the “lower class of native women
[who] prefer them as lords and masters to their own countrymen”. If Bailey
is disturbed that “traces of Chinese blood are very noticeable in the general
population”, we can only imagine how shemight feel about Chinese pollution
of the white, Anglo-Saxon race that is now settling in the archipelago. Intrigu-
ingly, Bailey also openly admits the supranational frame of her dislike of the
Chinese “plague” that “can live anywhere” and whose faults – moral, sexual
or otherwise – are congenital to a Chinese man wherever he may be on the
planet because “He is rarely troubled by conscientious scruples either in
these islands or in his own country”.
Nor are Robb and Bailey’s adumbrations sui generis to Chinese-Filipinos
in other important ways, as students of racist depictions of African-American
or Afro-Caribbean men will be aware. Frantz Fanon’s seminal problematiz-
ing of interracial relationships in Black Skin, White Masks (1952) can, in a
broad sense, shed more light on this iteration of anti-Sinicism. According
to Fanon – by way of a quotation from the French novelist René Maran –
when a black man realizes his “desire for that white flesh that has been for-
bidden to us Negroes as long as white men have ruled the world” (89), it is
a subversive political act that blurs a racial binary dependent on assumptions
about the superiority of whites and the inferiority of blacks. When a black
man marries a white woman, avers Fanon, he “[marries] white culture”
and his “restless hands [grasp] white civilization and dignity and make
them [his]” (84). Moreover, he is able to “prove to the others [white
people] that he is a man, their equal” (87). Whether in Fanon’s postwar Fran-
cophone world or in Bailey’s American colonial Manila, white supremacist
(and indeed patriarchal) regimes cannot tolerate such transgressions, for
they may persuade subaltern subjects that they ought to be treated with a
measure of humanity, respect and, as Fanon puts it, the feeling that “I am
worthy of white love” (84).
It is worth noting that, like the liberal eugenicists above, Robb’s racist
demonization of the Chinese predator coexists with a relatively progressive
– though not anticolonial – critique later in his book of the American political
class’s dubious rhetoric about the Philippines being “a United States
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possession, colony or what not” when in fact “these islands are territory of
the United States” (1926, 118). William D. Boyce was another American
liberal – again, by the criteria of his day – commentator on Philippine
matters, who opposed media monopolization (“Weekly Papers” 1906) and
supported labour unions while proprietor of a newspaper publishing
company (“Boyce Takes Stand” 1902). Boyce’s liberalism is less blatantly
derogatory to Chinese-Filipinos than Robb’s, although it remains beholden
to the same imperialist, racial-reductionist ideology. Interbreeding between
Chinese and Malay-Filipinos, Boyce writes, is not only acceptable but
welcome, for it yields “the best native type, more intelligent than the
Malay, stronger physically than the Chinese” (17). Whereas, for Gunter
and other Orientalists of the 1890s, such hybridity was a cause for concern
because many of the illustrado revolutionaries were Chinese méstizos, by
1914 these same men are now “foremost Filipinos” (112), to use Boyce’s ter-
minology, and include Emilio Aguinaldo, once leader of the anticolonial
revolution against first the Spanish and then the Americans, but now a
sworn ally of the latter.
After the Philippines attained limited independence from the US in 1946,
western Sinophobia came to echo the anxieties of Filipino nationalist dis-
courses. Caroline S. Hau holds that these discourses situated the Chinese
as “objects of distrust and censure” because they “[hitched] their desire to
acquire citizenship to their desire to protect or enhance their business inter-
ests” (2000, 138). The anxiety about Chinese wealth accumulation was
borne from a double standard: the “nationalization” laws of the 1950s and
1960s restricted Chinese participation in retail and other industries while
“[extending] equal treatment to American investors in all areas of the
economy” (136). The discrepancy is replicated in texts such as the American
author Raymond Nelson’s narrative-discursive work of non-fiction The Phi-
lippines (1968) which, largely myopic about the enormous scale of US econ-
omic involvement in the Philippines, casts vague aspersions about the
prosperity, insularity and cronyism of the “the Chinese minority… [that]
remains loyal to its cultural heritage” (116). Also noteworthy about Nelson
is that his depiction of the Chinese as a disquietingly discrete community
marks a departure from the often individualized, sometimes biologized ad
hominems of previous Orientalists. Put in another way, Nelson is a
product of western hegemonic discourse’s turn away from race-based value
judgements to those of a “culturalist” tenor, as Tzvetan Todorov regards it
(1975, 137). “What will remain unchanged” between racism and culturalism,
Todorov contends, “is the rigidity of determinism (cultural rather than phys-
ical now) and the discontinuity of humanity, compartmentalized into cul-
tures that cannot and must not communicate with one another effectively”.
Furthermore, “‘Culturalism’… replaces physical race with linguistic, histori-
cal or psychological race” (138). While Timothy Mo’s culturalism is not
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exactly clear in his 2000 novel Renegade or Halo² (a minor character,
Danton, has a “positively Chinese talent” for the property acquisition
board game Monopoly) (134), it is rather clearer in an interview Mo gave
to the British Independent newspaper:
It seems to me absolutely demonstrable that cultures are different… And if they’re
different, they will by definition be unequal… A society where you’re taken off in
the middle of the night for torture, or your kids fail an exam at school because you
don’t pay a bribe to the teacher: they are inferior societies. (quoted in Tonkin 1999)
While Mo is himself a member of the British Chinese diaspora and has won
critical accolades for addressing the intricacies of cultural identity, in the final
analysis he is a démodé essentialist: in Renegade or Halo² he writes of “The
immutability of our natures” (2000, 20) and elsewhere in that Independent
interview claims, “Stereotype has got a negative connotation, in ordinary
life and for a novelist. But I’ve never found it a bad word… Stereotypes
are more likely to be correct than anything else” (Tonkin 1999). As we can
see, while Sinophobia hinging on “economic function” (Hau 2000, 157)
was articulated more subtly than before in Orientalist texts, relevant para-
texts (such as Mo’s interview) reveal the same old crudely homogenizing atti-
tudes towards race and ethnicity.
Another material development that may have patterned these attitudes was
the Manila kidnapping “crisis” (Turner 1995, 1) of the 1990s, during which
at least $11 million was paid in ransoms (Mydans 1996). As the commerce
scholar Mark Turner explains, the families of Chinese-Filipinos, as well as
mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, were disproportionately targeted
because they were “widely perceived to be successful in business” (1995,
2). Turner further asserts that these crimes produced public and official con-
cerns about the security of the Philippine economy, given the risks of “loss of
investment opportunities and the withdrawal of funds” to “safer locations”
(2). This is a central theme of Seth Mydans’ 1996 New York Times
feature, which quotes with approval then-President Ramos’ warning that
“the current wave of kidnappings has begun to have a dampening effect on
the overseas Chinese investment that has been an important part of the coun-
try’s recent growth”. There is arguably a very subtle form of victim-blaming
at play here, since the implication is that foreign-based Chinese withdrawal
from business activities in Manila – an understandably self-preservational
response to the threat of kidnapping – is making them a liability to continued
Philippine prosperity. This perception takes on a supranational dimension
when we consider that, coterminous with fears of non-Filipino Chinese
capital flight, was a relaxation of nationalization legislation that prompted
“the rise of largescale retailing… concentrated in the hands of a small
group of upper-stratum ‘Chinese Filipino’ individuals” (Hau 2000, 167).
THE MAKING OF A SUPRANATIONAL STEREOTYPE
Tom Syke s
13............................
Additionally, commentators such as Mydans might have been party to a
popular sentiment in the US at the time that American “national identity”
was being eroded by Chinese “direct foreign investment” in New York City
(Kwong and Dušanka 2007, 324).
The latest incarnation of Sinophobia in the Philippine context can be
mapped on to a momentous change in China itself rather than any in the
US, UK or the Philippines. Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms beginning in
1979 triggered a period of extraordinary growth and production which
was to culminate in China becoming the second largest economy in the
world in 2011, a position that it has retained ever since. Over this period,
western media significations of China went through several stages, argues
Zengjun Peng, beginning with optimism about China’s embrace of capitalist
policies. But after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, the media
focused on China’s authoritarian politics and internal repression. In the
1990s and early 2000s, the picture became more nuanced, with China
“regarded both as a strategic partner and a potential rival”, given the
strengthening economic bonds between the US and China (2004, 60). By
the 2010s, the New York Times, the leading establishmentarian US newspa-
per, was deprecating “vulgar displays of newfound [Chinese] wealth” (Ban,
Sastry, and Dutta 2013, 286) and other hegemonic media were expressing
a “concern” about “China’s economic achievements” (Jonquières 2012, 9).
The Scotland-born, Australia-based nurse and memoirist Duncan Alexander
McKenzie’s book The Unlucky Country (2012) emerged from this ideologi-
cal vortex, even if its hetero-stereotypes are so retrograde they could have
been lifted from the pages of an Orientalist text published a hundred years
before. McKenzie animalizes Filipinos (“innocently sensual creatures”)
(438), condemns their culture as so much “nonsensical superficiality” that
“offers no future for the Philippine nation” (3997) and accuses them of pre-
ferring “sociability as opposed to a strong work ethic” (1319). McKenzie’s
construction of Filipinos as animal-like, unsophisticated and lackadaisical
is perhaps a corollary to his warning that, in this new millennial world of
western decline and eastern growth, the Philippines is lagging behind its
neighbours economically, and this could have gloomy consequences for
western regional hegemony, and the Philippines’ supporting role in it:
“Look to the Chinese and the Taiwanese and the populace of Hong Kong.
They have a lifelong drive to academic achievement and economic success,
and that is why they will rule the region, and perhaps the world” (3999–
4001). There is a note of lament for the old days of western regnance in
McKenzie’s bogus distinction between the Philippines’ current “problematic”
dealings with China and its historically “straightforward and uncomplicated”
relationship with the US (4002–4003). Moreover, McKenzie cautions melo-
dramatically, “China is a tiger, and it is hungrily pacing back and forth eying
its prey. It is unashamedly hegemonistic. Nothing will shake its resolve”
interventions – 0:0 14............................
(3990). In his restricted view, such errant aggression bulks large with “the
friendly big brother, the good old US of A” (4016), a description which,
coming from an author with even a vague grasp of the history of American
(neo)imperial intervention in the Philippines, would surely be ironic.
Rather, what is blindingly evident here is that the myth of US magnanimity
towards the Philippines continues to thrive in Orientalism, despite having
been long discredited by more accurate analyses.
Since President Rodrigo Duterte’s courting of financial investment and pol-
itical goodwill from Beijing which began in 2016, western liberal commenta-
tors have been more assertive than McKenzie in their animus towards China.
Tom Smith, the Guardian pundit and academic at the Royal Air Force
College in Cranwell, UK, laments that surging Chinese investment in the Phi-
lippines and an apparent climbdown by Duterte in a dispute with Beijing over
territories in the South China Sea is tantamount to a “surrender of the US alli-
ance… [not] in the better interests of the Filipino people” (2016). But his case
is far from watertight. While it is true that Beijing has pledged to invest $24
billion in the Philippine infrastructure, this does not mean Duterte has turned
his back on the US, however anti-American his rhetoric can be. The US is the
Philippines’ chief trading partner with regard to “countries that imported the
most Filipino shipments by dollar value during 2019” (China is third on this
list) (Workman 2020) and the US is erecting new military facilities in the
archipelago (Robson 2019). At any rate, Duterte is not the first Philippine
leader to play a “cat-and-mouse game” (Sevastopolu and Peel 2017) of main-
taining good relations with the US while improving relations with China. In
1975 Ferdinand Marcos signed a joint agreement with the communist gov-
ernment in Beijing which included the statement “there is but one China
and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory” (“Joint Communi-
que” 2017). In 1997 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo allowed a Chinese naval
ship to enter Manila (Cook 2017).
Even supposing western fears about realignment with Beijing are well
founded, they are nonetheless driven by a hypocritical assumption that
China is a unique threat to Asian peace. Duterte Harry: Fire and Fury in
the Philippines (2018), the Channel 4 News (UK) correspondent Jonathan
Miller’s blend of biography and reportage, is an intensively researched and
multi-fronted critique of Duterte’s gruesome necropolitics and sociopathic
personality. But Miller’s grasp of international relations is less convincing,
given that he bemoans “Beijing’s remorseless militarization of the South
China Sea” (294) while saying nothing about the bigger-scale and far more
aggressive cordon of four hundred American bases in nations surrounding
China, some with long-range missile capacities (Pilger 2018). Moreover,
Miller does not acknowledge the fact that, unlike China, US armed forces
are currently operating in seventeen Asian countries, including the Philip-
pines, in the name of the so-called War on Terror (Engelhardt 2018). But
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behind the fig leaf of this alleged campaign to uphold global peace, stability
and democracy is a violent, destabilizing and undemocratic neo-imperialism
in which the US “arrogates a right to global interference in almost every-
thing”, argues M. G. E. Kelly (2015, 93). The damage done to the world
by American power stands in contrast to China’s when we compare the
two nations’ track records as imperialists in Asia since World War II.
China invaded Tibet in 1950 and continues viciously to repress separatist
movements there and in other regions such as Xinjiang Uyghur, while
America has fought devastating wars of choice in the Korean and Indochinese
peninsulars; Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq; and pursued lethal covert oper-
ations in China (on behalf of the anti-communist Guomindang nationalists
in the late 1940s); the Philippines, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Appar-
ently, it is not militarization of Southeast Asia per se that bothers Smith and
Miller et al., just the Chinese militarization of Southeast Asia. There are geo-
economic as well as geopolitical reasons to doubt that the new “Yellow Peril”
have the strength, resources or inclination to rampage across the Philippines
and Southeast Asia. “Far from being an imperialist power”, Kelly writes,
“China remains, in effect, a victim of imperialism (particularly in the form
of unequal exchange)”. On pitiful wages and in perilous conditions,
Chinese workers make cheap goods for western consumption, and most of
the profits generated in China from trade with the West end up being
reinvested in the West (2015, 96).
This new continental military- and economics-based Sinophobia has
redrawn the textual map of Manila. A May 2018 Bloomberg News article
offers a snapshot of the daily realities of Duterte’s Faustian pact with
China. “Restaurants serving Chinese hotpots and dumplings” and “Mandarin
broadcasts at theMall of Asia” are catering for 100,000 recent Chinese immi-
grants, whose arrival in Manila has profited several local corporations
(“Chinese Money” 2018). However, in keeping with the hoary cliché about
Chinese avarice, this human “deluge” has also contributed to soaring house
prices, which is a source of worry for one Filipino resident, at least. “I
hope they become an asset to the community”, he says, “and not just out
to make money”. The article’s framing of the Chinese as at once useful to
and alien to Philippine society is consonant with Caroline S. Hau’s claim
that Philippine nationalism has construed the Chinese-Filipinos as “a
foreign presence, but they are a familiar foreign presence” (2000, 134).
“Nationalist thinking about money”, she continues, “was articulated with
the idea of the ‘foreigner’” (166), despite a grudging acceptance of the
Chinese-Filipinos’ “contribution to national development” (175). In a
further signifier of problematic cupidity, the Bloomberg piece states that
dozens of Chinese gambling companies are setting up shop in the city, produ-
cing a boom that “[won’t] last forever”. It is instructive to compare this fore-
boding coverage of Chinese investment with the celebratory tone of an earlier
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BBC report on how “innovative technology” is driving Manila’s “amazing”
(so the Filipino head of the Contact Centre of the Philippines puts it) call
centres and BPOs (Business Process Outsourcing concerns) that are con-
tracted to British and American corporations (McGeown 2012). Rather
than, as per the Bloomberg story, highlighting the risks of this burgeoning
sector, call centres are presented as an unalloyed “success” that are fully sus-
tainable thanks to government “tax breaks, fast-tracked permits and other
perks”. Whereas Bloomberg News paints the expatriate Chinese workers
and businesspeople as a “deluge” that is culturally reshaping Manila and
stoking anxiety amongst its indigenes, no such concerns are raised by
several recent media accounts of western retail chains opening branches in
Manila, for example (Sayson 1919; Goldberg 2019; Hotel Resource 2019).
This “one rule for the West, another rule for China” discrepancy is conspic-
uous in Jonathan Miller’s work, too. Swift to admonish Duterte’s spending
programme for leaving the Philippines in “Debt bondage to China” (2018,
296), Miller has nothing to say about how, in the 1980s and 1990s,
western-led international financial organizations beggared the Philippine
economy with crippling loans and destructive free market “reforms” (Bello
2018, ix). Ironically, a legacy of these policies was the popular discontent
that swept Duterte – whom Miller accuses of bringing unprecedented
“chaos and disequilibrium to the Philippines” (2018, 288) – to power in
2016.
In the age of Duterte’s campaign of extra-judicial killings (EJKs) of drug
dealers and abusers, Triad gangsters and other Chinese involved in the nar-
cotics trade are a malevolent presence in contemporary Orientalist narra-
tives. Unsurprisingly, this presence is not immune to the now age-old
suspicions of greed, criminality, otherness and foreignness. According to
“Duterte’s War”, a 2016 item of investigative journalism by John Chalmers,
an illicit Chinese facility north of Manila is capable of producing a stunning
$24 million worth of methamphetamine per day. The “Chinese-looking
men”, as locals identify them, running the operation are a synecdoche for
the disproportionally high representation of Chinese nationals in the Philip-
pine drugs scene. The trope of yet another malignant Chinese infiltration of
Philippine society is reinforced by Chalmers’ claim that the “cooks” and “che-
mists” needed for such labs are flown in from mainland China and are liable
for a national “problem” that is “made in China”. In Miller’s book there is
also a going native-style theme of Filipinos being morally compromised
after they have been bodily besmirched by unscrupulous Chinese. In an
echo of the Filipino villains forcing “the indelible mark of the Katipunan”
(54) secret society on Jack Curzon’s body in Archibald Clavering Gunter’s
1899 novel discussed above, Miller recounts the infamous anecdote of
Duterte’s son Paolo who refused to remove his clothes and show a Senate
inquiry a Triad tattoo he was alleged to possess (2018, 96). At first glance,
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whereas previous models of the Chinese rested on shaky empirical foun-
dations – Rupert Hodder has identified long-standing epistemological
obstacles to ascertaining the “degrees of Chineseness” within a historically
hybridic Chinese-Filipino population and therefore the true ethnic compo-
sition of Philippine business ownership (2007, 90–91) – the contemporary
Orientalist focus on Chinese traffickers would appear to be more firmly
grounded in objective truth. After all, China is “the biggest source of the
meth and of the precursor chemicals used to produce the synthetic drug
that are being smuggled into the Philippines”, reports Chalmers. Moreover,
between January 2015 and August 2016, “Of 77 foreign nationals
arrested for meth-related drug offenses… 49 were Chinese… , Taiwanese
or Hong Kong residents”. However, while these facts are hard to dispute,
the ideological slant of the writers who deploy them is betrayed by the omis-
sion of other relevant facts that cast doubt on the notion of Chinese omnipo-
tence in the narcotics realm. In just one month (July–August) 2016, reports
the Philippine news website Rappler, “12,923 individuals [were] arrested
and 626,556 voluntarily surrendered” (Gavilan 2016), which somewhat
dwarves the figure of 49 arrests of Chinese over the much longer nineteen-
month period Chalmers cites. As the social psychologists Bordalo,
Coffman, Gennaioli and Shleifer have discovered, “stereotypes are often inac-
curate. The vast majority of Florida residents are not elderly, the vast
majority of the Irish are not red-headed, and flying is really pretty safe”.
But this does not stop “Social groups that have been historically mistreated”
falling prey to “bad stereotyping, perhaps because the groups in power want
to perpetuate false beliefs about them” (2016, 1754). According to this
theory, Orientalist “false beliefs” about Chinese crime have more to do
with anti-Chinese sentiment – both historic and modern-day – than with
real contemporary statistics. And the singling out of one group for ills that
other groups also bear responsibility for is as ethically odious as it is intellec-
tually sloppy. It is therefore worth noting Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency spokesman Derrick Carreon’s assertion that it is not just Chinese
crime syndicates that are responsible for methamphetamine supply to the Phi-
lippines; gangs from Mexico and several African nations are complicit too
(Kyodo 2018).
For the sake of clarity, it is important to assert that criticisms made above
of western media and literary distortions of current Chinese-Philippines
relations do not and should not produce a contraposition that in any way
exonerates Chinese state-corporate exploitation of the Philippines. While
there are elements of truth to western commentators’ allegations that
Duterte has “sold out” his country to Chinese interests, the rhetorical validity
of such allegations is somewhat undermined by their selective excision of
other factors that point to western myopia towards, or even complicity in,
the current problems. We should not be unduly surprised about such
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selectivity given that it is a sine qua non of regressive cultural stereotypes of
all varieties. As the social psychologists Kooman and Djiker have found,
It is generally accepted that in processing information people are guided by relevant
cognitive representations or schemas [supporting perceptions of ‘outgroup’ stereo-
types]. There is also agreement that information relevant to an activated schema is
preferentially encoded, whereas irrelevant information is more or less neglected.
(Koomen 1997, 598)
To be sure, the making of the supranational Chinese stereotype over the
last four centuries has involved a good deal of such “selective processing”,
to borrow further from Kooman and Djiker’s lexicon, about the Chinese in
Manila, China, the United States and Europe. The supranationality of this
symbolic order means that it necessarily resonates with a broader debate
about representation that has major material ramifications. The utterances
of western hegemonic media are often in line with the versions of anti-Sini-
cism we have explored in this essay: Chinese enterprise must be simul-
taneously envied, feared and grudgingly admired (Roh, Huang, and Nui
2015, 12). However, such attitudes are underpinned by a potentially existen-
tial threat to the world: the trade war between the US and China, which many
commentators fear could escalate into a shooting war, given mounting ten-
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